Beyond Busing:  Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation by Gresser, Lawrence T.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 84 
Issue 4 Issues 4&5 
1986 
Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation 
Lawrence T. Gresser 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Race Commons, Litigation Commons, 
and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lawrence T. Gresser, Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation, 84 MICH. L. REV. 985 
(1986). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol84/iss4/40 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
February-April 1986] Law, Government, and Society 985 
BEYOND BUSING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN SEGREGA-
TION. By Paul R. Dimond. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
1985. Pp. xii, 411. $29.95. 
Beyond Busing, Paul Dimond's excellent and informative book on 
the major urban desegregation cases of the 1970s, is an exquisitely 
well-timed contribution to the debate on the effectiveness and propri-
ety of busing elementary and secondary school students to achieve 
school desegregation. Dimond litigated some of the decade's most im-
portant busing cases, and this book focuses on the trial and appellate 
histories of Bradley v. Milliken, 1 Brinkman v. Dayton Board of Educa-
tion, 2 Evans v. Buchanan, 3 and Penick v. Columbus Board of Educa-
tion. 4 Dimond's accounts of these cases and his imperfectly linked 
description of two important housing cases add up to a powerful argu-
ment that, in the words of National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP) general counsel Nathaniel Jones, "what 
most judges and the public perceived as de facto or adventitious segre-
gation was . . . de jure or official segregation and intentional discrimi-
nation, public and private" (p. 30). 
Dimond's description of the landmark Detroit cross-district busing 
case, Bradley v. Milliken, is especially compelling. Bradley grew out of 
a desegregation plan that died. In April 1970, Detroit school board 
president Abraham Zwerdling persuaded the school board to pass a 
school decentralization plan that called for "regional boundaries maxi-
mizing the limited potential for desegregation within the city and 
redrawing attendance boundaries for twelve of the twenty-two regular 
high schools across the color line of residential segregation" (p. 27). 
Two days later the Michigan House of Representatives reversed the 
board's plan. The Detroit Branch of the NAACP filed suit in federal 
district court to challenge the rescission of the April desegregation 
1. 433 F.2d 897 (6th. Cir. 1970), 438 F.2d 945 (6th. Cir.), on remand, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. 
Mich. 1971), 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), ajfd. in part and revd. in part, 484 F.2d 215 
(6th Cir. 1973), revd., 418 U.S. 717 (1974), on remand, 402 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich.), 411 F. 
Supp. 943 (E.D. Mich. 1975), ajfd., 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), ajfd., 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
2. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1974), 518 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1975), cerL 
denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975), 539 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1976), vacated sub nom. Dayton Bd. of 
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, on remand, Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232 (S.D. 
Ohio 1977), revd., 583 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1978), ajfd. sub nom. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brink-
man, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). 
3. 379 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Del. 1974), 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), ajfd. mem., 423 U.S. 962 
(1975), 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Delaware State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Evans, 429 U.S. 973 (1976), ajfd., 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 880, 435 F. 
Supp. 832 (D. Del. 1977), 447 F. Supp. 982 (D. Del.), ajfd., 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980). 
4. 429 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Ohio 1977), ajfd. in part, vacated and remanded in part, 583 F.2d 
787 (6th Cir. 1978), ajfd., 443 U.S. 449 (1979), on remand, 519 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Ohio), ajfd., 
663 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982). 
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plan and to require the Detroit school board to go further and com-
pletely eliminate illegal racial segregation in Detroit schools. 
Dimond emphasizes that the NAACP lawyers did not originally 
contemplate the cross-district remedy that would make Bradley 
famous: 
The complaint requested that the board submit a plan for the next school 
year to eliminate racially identifiable schools, but there was no request 
for a plan that would go beyond the boundaries of the Detroit school 
district. Given the extreme difficulty of the case . . . there was little 
inclination among the NAACP legal staff to include a plea for city-sub-
urban integration at the outset. [p. 31] 
The idea of a metropolitan remedy evolved from what Dimond 
calls the "conversion" of Federal District Court Judge Stephen J, 
Roth. In a pretrial order, Judge Roth rejected plaintiffs' proposal to 
reinstate the April 1970 integration plan and instead provisionally ap-
proved a voluntary "magnet" school plan. At a news conference he 
called the NAACP lawyers "outsiders [who] should go away and let 
Detroit solve its own problems" (p. 36). Yet weeks of trial testimony 
slowly led him to change his mind about the extent and cause of segre-
gation in Detroit. Witness after witness testified that housing and 
school segregation were widespread and did not result from "free 
choice" or "economics": 
At each family-income and housing-cost level, [Dr. Karl] Tauber 
demonstrated from the census data how blacks and whites alike in all 
characteristics save race were still almost completely segregated. Eco-
nomics did not account for the residential segregation by race. Based on 
data from many opinion surveys and the continuing black efforts to seek 
genuinely open and integrated housing, Tauber added, "I don't think the 
choice factor is very relevant." [p. 47] 
Judge Roth concluded that along with government actors from other 
areas, school authorities actively participated in the maintenance of 
segregation. He found that the Detroit school board used optional 
zones in neighborhoods undergoing racial transition, attendance 
boundaries aimed at containing black students, and an "unmistakably 
dual pattern" of school construction to keep black and white students 
in segregated schools (pp. 68-70). After forty-one trial days, Judge 
Roth had come full circle. He "concluded that plaintiffs had proven 
all elements of their claim that black families and pupils had been con-
tained in a basically separate set of blacks-only schools and housing" 
(p. 70). In an interview several months later, Judge Roth said: 
We all got an education during the course of the trial. It opened my 
eyes. . . . I would never have known or understood the meaning and 
history of racial discrimination and segregation .... I hope I get a chance 
before this case is over to say publicly, from the bench, why I think 
[integration] has to happen. [p. 72] 
As Judge Roth slowly came to accept the plaintiffs' arguments, he 
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began to question witnesses on whether a Detroit-only remedy could 
truly desegregate the schools. The judge concluded that the state of 
Michigan was ultimately responsible for remedying school segregation 
in Detroit and that only a plan that mcluded the neighboring, largely 
white suburbs of Detroit could effect such a remedy. He actually re-
jected plaintiffs' provisional Detroit-only integration plan on the 
grounds that it "would clearly make the Detroit school system racially 
identifiable as Black," would "not lend itself as a building block for a 
metropolitan plan," and would "increase the flight of Whites from the 
city and tbe system" (p. 79). Dimond says: 
Having sat through forty-one days of trial and having learned how the 
color line in Detroit had shifted over time and the blacks-only ghetto 
had expanded virtually all the way to the city limits, Roth was not about 
to make the boundary of the Detroit school district the new racial divide 
.... [p. 80] 
Judge Roth ordered instead a cross-district busing plan involving 53 of 
the 86 school districts in Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Counties. 
Dimond is careful to point out the legal problems with the remedy 
theory (pp. 63-64). First, there was little case law on state responsibil-
ity because post-Brown plaintiffs had sued individual school districts 
rather than southern states. More importantly, the Supreme Court in 
Swann had stated that the "nature of the violation determines the 
scope of the remedy," and Dimond admits that "our legal vision was 
not clear" on the question of precisely how the "containment" viola-
tion extended beyond the boundaries of Detroit (p. 81). Plaintiffs did 
present evidence that the dual-system pattern of school construction 
and faculty assignments extended into the suburbs. Judge Roth used 
this evidence as a second reason for ordering cross-district busing (pp. 
82-83), but Dimond suggests several times that the plaintiffs simply 
did not have sufficient resources to prepare an adequate theory of met-
ropolitan-wide violation (pp. 40, 64). Finally, the suburban school dis-
tricts that would be affected by a metropolitan remedy had not been 
joined as parties and had not been heard in court at all (p. 64). 
Dimond traces Bradley through the slow, rather agonizing appel-
late process that finally resulted in a five-to-four Supreme Court deci-
sion reversing Judge Roth and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on 
the question of metropolitan relief. One of the great strengths of this 
book is that it provides the reader with sufficient information to criti-
cize intelligently the majority's characterization of the trial court rec-
ord and the choices available to Judge Roth. 
Chief Justice Burger's central argument is superficially plausible: 
To approve the remedy ordered by the courts [below] would impose on 
the outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional 
violation, a wholly impermissible remedy based on a standard not hinted 
at in Brown I and II or any holding of this Court .... The constitutional 
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right of the Negro [children] residing in Detroit is to attend a unitary 
school system in that district. [pp. 110-11] 
Yet this argument, without more, does not withstand much scrutiny. 
As then-Judge Wade McCree pointed out during oral argument before 
the Sixth Circuit, the fourteenth amendment probably does not require 
a finding of wrongdoing against every subdivision affected by a remedy 
plan. "Take, for example, a reapportionment case where the people of 
Detroit have less than one-man, one-vote but its immediate suburbs 
are not malapportioned. In providing a remedy for the injured Detroit 
voters by redrawing election districts, the suburbs are not immune, are 
they?" (p. 92). Burger's conclusion that school districts in Michigan 
are completely autonomous may distinguish school segregation cases 
from voting cases, but again Dimond's account of the district/state 
relation is detailed enough to raise serious questions about Burger's 
analysis. 
Dimond's account of the Dayton school case, Brinkman v. Dayton 
Board of Education, 5 shows even more clearly the difficulties in prov-
ing that apparently de facto segregation is actually de jure (pp. 121-
46). Like Bradley, Brinkman can be said to begin with a rescinded 
desegregation plan. In December 1971, the Dayton school board ad-
mitted that Dayton schools were racially segregated because of school 
board actions and inaction, and ordered the superintendent to develop 
a pupil reassignment plan; in January 1972, a new board reimposed 
the old attendance zones and assignment policy. 
Dimond begins his story with the words of black students and 
teachers who had suffered years of discrimination in Dayton: 
Q. Mrs. Greer, could you describe for us when you first experienced 
what you considered to be discriminatory acts in the Dayton Public 
Schools? 
A. I can remember in my second year at Weaver Elementary 
School. . . . There was a Christmas play. . . . I ... tried out ... and 
wanted to take the part of an angel. [T]he teacher who was in charge of 
the play indicated that I could not be an angel in the play because there 
were no colored angels. [p. 7] 
Another witness, Ella Taylor Lowrey, described the structure in which 
she taught: 
This small frame [building] ... being very fragile, was soon dilapidated, 
in bad condition. The walls were bad; the windows were bad and broken 
out, and the heating unit became bad. The [board] finally built what I 
would call a permanent building behind this frame house ... [with] four 
rooms. Then the two-room portable was tom down. At that time, we 
had eight black classrooms with eight black teachers .... I had 62 chil-
dren in the sixth grade room .... The white teacher in the brick bl!ilding 
with all white children had 20. [p. 4] 
These statements were made at trial to bolster plaintiffs' legal the-
5. See note 2 supra. 
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ory that Dayton had a dual school system in 1954 and was required to 
dismantle it. Like plaintiffs' broader theory of de jure segregation -
that school board authorities encouraged and exacerbated existing 
housing segregation both before and after Brown - the "affirmative 
duty" theory ran into a hostile trial judge and a complicated set of 
facts. Here and elsewhere Dimond is painfully honest about the weak-
nesses in his case. He admits that Brinkman suffered in the Supreme 
Court in part because 
the Dayton brief had to turn, again and again, to the underlying facts of 
the case and the record evidence of official discrimination if we were to 
prevail .... "Racial imbalance," "optional zones," and "recent rescis-
sion" [of a desegregation plan] may amount to a constitutional violation 
of some sort, but the extent of their segregative impact was not clear and 
had never been determined by the courts below .... Our best hope was to 
convince the Court that the record evidence showed a long-standing and 
continuing pattern of pervasive, intentional segregation. Our problem 
was that the Supreme Court sits to review the law, not to evaluate 
masses of evidence. [pp. 168-69] 
In contrast, the trial record in the Columbus school case6 was much 
stronger, and neither the Sixth Circuit nor the Supreme Court had 
much trouble finding that desegregation was required (pp. 274-76, 
376-79). 
The Brinkman testimony is powerful in its own right, and Beyond 
Busing is rich in other ways as well. Dimond is particularly good at 
relating his slice of legal history to the broader developments of the 
1970s, and his occasional remarks about trial tactics are amusing and 
instructive. Dimond's honesty about both his successes and failures 
makes his book required reading for civil rights lawyers seeking loop-
holes in the busing cases he describes. But the book's real importance 
extends beyond the cases he discusses and beyond even the issue of 
school desegregation. Judicial opinions work in part by changing our 
understanding of the problems that give rise to lawsuits. 7 Beyond 
Busing works by showing in great detail how some trial and appellate 
court judges shaped legal materials to produce five very important de-
cisions that changed our understanding of the roots and tractability of 
racial segregation. Implicit in Dimond's book is the message that the 
process of redefinition and the struggle for desegregation will continue. 
- Lawrence T. Gresser 
6. See note 4 supra. 
7. I owe this idea to Professor James B. White of the University of Michigan Law School. 
